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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
The introduction of the microcomputer to business and
its application as a multifunctional desktop workstation
has greatly enhanced the concept of end-user
(distributed) computing. As a result of continuous
development in the modern electronic technology,
microcomputers have become an integral part of the
corporate information processing resource. In the
beginning, a microcomputer was treated as a toy for the
individual who acquired it. However, because of the use
over time of the microcomputer, the user view has changed
due to the capabilities of the machine. From the basic
concept as a toy, the microcomputer has moved to a
standalone helpmate. The individual has matured in the
use of the microcomputer, and now begins to use it for
assistance in performing his/her day-to-day work. The
microcomputer at this point has become an extension of
one's working tool capabilities, just like the telephone.
While the individual becomes more skilled with
his/her standalone system, he/she also notices that the
power of microcomputer needs to be expanded. For example,
the individual might want a larger disk capacity for the
required jobs, and this may require more resources than
most microcomputers can provide. Also, the individual
might want to download part or all of an entire database
from the mainframe; to upload processed data that resides
on a microcomputer to the mainframe database; and to
execute a microcomputer-resident program using the data
downloaded from the mainframe. Thus, there is a need for
a link between the micro and mainframe. With this link,
the individual now becomes an end-user who communicates
with a corporate database through the medium of the
microcomputer
.
Nothing is perfect. Inevitably, this link has both
advantages and disadvantages. Some of the advantages are
the wide variety of permutations and combinations of
activity, and the improvement of productivity for the end-
user's daily work. One of the disadvantages is the
associated, potential security problems. This
disadvantage is caused partly by the fact that more "first
time" end-users [8] are accessing corporate databases, and
partly by the issues inherent in microcomputing. For
instance, the possibility that the end-user can expose
confidential corporate data is very high, because all of
the information is stored on easy-to-carry floppy
diskettes. These potential problems are common in any
type of configuration of distributed processing.
Nevertheless, most of the problems can be resolved by the
software products currently available on the market. A
survey of several products was conducted, and the result
shows that menu-driven systems and on-line help messages
ease users' application of the software package. In
addition, the reasonable price of the products and their
various functions easily justify users acquisition of the
products. This paper attempts to present the security
problem in this new environment with some solutions.
Also, related security concerns are discussed inorder to
improve the security of this new environment.
1.2 The Basic Problems Of Today
In this new environment, the central computer site is
well protected from security threats; however, the end-
user site is not. This is true because current operating
systems for microcomputers do not support the high level
of security that is present on mainframe computers.
Therefore, the majority of the newly introduced security
problems are at the microcomputer sites.
There are four existing problems which increase the
complexity of securing this link, and they are listed as
follows:
First: the proliferation of microcomputers has
transformed the person on the micro side of a mainframe
link from a data processing professional to a "first time"
computer center manager — an individual who never before
has been responsible for, or even involved with the
control of a total computer systemtS]. In other words,
those new managers are unfamiliar with the types of
control needed. Since most of these first time managers
do not realize the significance of data control, they
often store sensitive, confidential corporate data on
floppy diskettes without extra care. When data is
downloaded and then modified, they often do not understand
the necessity for backups, nor do they understand the
problems inherent in duplicated data in terms of
consistency. Therefore, many potential security problems
are the result of such new processing enviroments.
Second: in the past, the computer security officer
was faced with only the task of securing a large computer
installation. Now, with the existence of the individual
microcomputers in the offices of an organization, computer
security becomes much more complicated, since new
knowledge is needed in order to accommodate this change.
Nevertheless, most computer security officers have little
or no knowledge concerning the microcomputer and its
peripherals, the proper handling of floppy diskettes, or
that there are, to a limited extent, capabilities
available for providing security for such systems.
Third: once numerous microcomputers have been
dispersed throughout the organization, there is a lack of
information about particular data which is 'floating'
around within the organization. The central site concerns
involve the downloaded data that might be destroyed or
misused by either authorized or unauthorized users. In
other words, the central site can exert no control over
the information stored on diskettes that was originally
mainframe-resident
.
Finally: due to the fast-developing technology in
modern communication, access to the corporate database is
no longer confined to individuals within the corporate
premises. Employees can now use those newly-developed
communication devices at home to gain access to the
corporate database located within the organization.
Consequently, this new work enviroment immediately causes
us to focus on some new risks. This is due to the simple
fact that we have no control over the corporate
information (in electronic form), once it leaves the
controlled, corporate premises. Among those risks are:
"improper actions by employees of the servicing
communications carrier, who may observe, copy, or change
messages, or divert them to unauthorized stations; systems
failures in the utility switching computers, which could
misroute, garble, or destroy information [20]"), as well
as the obvious misuse of information by the employee, or
those in the home environment.
Chapter 2. Solutions To The Problem
2.1 Education Programs For The First Time End-User
Many first time end-users are often unaware of the
importance of computer security. In order to avoid the
unnecessary losses of vital information and to achieve the
intent of management policies, a well designed first-time,
end-user, education program is indeed a must. The
objectives of this program would be to ensure that the
persons involved are aware of their security
responsibilities, the potential risks, and some of the
currently available measures that they can take to reduce
these potential risks. A further important aspect of this
education program is to make the employee aware of the
importance of the information which is being manipulated
by the micros.
Another similar program is also needed to educate
those end-users who already have some computer literacy.
It is worthwhile to have these kinds of educational
programs in place, because properly trained end-users are
usually more productive, and more careful!
Perry [16] suggests that a good education program
encompasses the following:
(1) Formal training programs.
(2) Training procedures for uers of microcomputers.
(3) Awareness programs for supervisors and managers.
(4) Security procedures for microcomputer operators.
(5) Posters/devices posted in the microcomputer area to
create an awareness of the need for security.
2.2 Physical Security Of Microcomputers
The microcomputer is itself valuable and therefore
must be protected from being sabotaged. Some of the
physical security measures can be used to avoid these
problems
.
These include [ 16 ]
:
(1) Locking the microcomputer in a secure area.
(2) Using guards, alarms, and other monitoring devices to
detect penetration during nonworking hours.
(3) Locking areas when employees are absent.
(4) Using devices to lock the computer to its physical
location.
(5) Putting locks on the computer to turn off power and
prevent unautherized users from having access to the
machine.
Once an unauthorized user gains access to a
microcomputer, then that user may also gain access to the
corporate database. More often than not, this will result
in the disclosure of vital information which might lead to
a significant loss. Controlling access to a microcomputer
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is the first step in overcoming this problem. Today
there
are some software products, hardware devices or
combination of both on the market to meet this need. One
of the software products [8] uses the idea that is
described as follows: Place the compiled version of the
program on every diskette with an AUTOEXEC.BAT file(a file
that allows the user to automatically execute commands or
programs when MS-DOS is started) . When the system is
booted , the user is notified that this is a protected
diskette. After pressing any key, the user is then
requested to enter his or her password. Failure to enter
the proper password will cause the bell to ring and the
keyboard will lock. Even if the correct password is
entered at the outset, the user is requested to answer
three personal questions. Failure to do so properly for
any question will initiate the alarm sequence. Only after
all questions have been correctly answered will the user
then be allowed to access the system. Clearly, this
scheme is no better than the trust of the individual, and
the care with which the individual protects that
information. In any security environment, the user always
becomes the weak link in the entire process.
2.3 Logical Security Of Microcomputers
Not only is protection of the microcomputer itself
necessary, but we must also be concerned with the
protection of data files and programs. The latter is the
logical security issues associated with microcomputers.
Some of the logical security measures for use with the
microcomputer include [9,16]:
(1) Blanking computer memory before turning off
the
computer
.
(2) Blanking storage media when no longer needed.
(3) Security checks on individuals operating
the
microcomputer
.
(4) Do not leave the microcomputer without logging off
of the system.
(5) Data that is downloaded from the corporate database
should be stored on floppy diskettes rather than on
the hard disk. This is because floppies can be
removed to a more secure place while the hard disk
can not.
(6) Encrypt data that is stored on the diskettes. A
simple encryption technique could be for less
important data, while a more powerful one could be
used for the highest level of secured data.
(7) Provide added security by requiring "logging in" for
a specific program. We can emulate the more
sophisticated system by placing appropriate routines
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within a special loggon program.
In addition to the above measures, we also need to
pay more attention to the handling of diskettes. End-users
use diskettes to store information downloaded from the
corporate database. As a consequence, diskettes are
plentiful and widely dispersed, making inventory and
tracking difficult. In addition, diskettes are a primary
target for penetration, because they are much easier to
carry away than the fixed disks used by a mainframe or
a bulky package of computer printouts. Thus, we need to
carefully consider the handling of diskettes. There are
several controls which we need to consider in order to
handle the diskettes properly.
The first one is the adoption of a scheme for
classifying information by sensitivity and
criticality[24] . This scheme helps to ensure that the
data is treated consistently wherever it resides
( mainframe, microcomputer ) , and whatever form it
takes (paper, diskettes). Diskettes that contain sensitive
information can be separated easily from those containing
less sensitive information after a classification scheme
has been adopted. In this way, the security officer need
not apply stringent controls to all diskettes regardless
of the sensitivity of the information each contains.
Secondly, we need to consider the backup issue, since
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keeping copies of important files is the best protection
against destruction of data. In order to encourage users
to perforin necessary backup activities, backup procedures
should be simple and easy to use. This can be achieved by
using a centralized backup procedure, such as having a
mainframe keep backup copies of the data resident on a
connected microcomputer. Next, individual users should
maintain an index of the programs and data files stored on
each individual diskette[8]. This indexing could include
fields to record, for example, file number, diskette
number, date created, data most recently updated, and the
author's initials. The purpose of this record would be to
provide some insight into the individual files which exist
throughout an organization and to avoid time-consuming
searches for files, and confusion about which file or
diskette is the most recent version.
Finally, we should consider the residues problem[14].
Here, if an area of memory is released by a user or by the
system when a file is deleted, the information stored in
memory or on the diskettes may remain there, although it
is inaccessible in the normal way. With skilled
programming, that information can then be read by the next
user to whom the space is allocated. It may result in the
disclosure of sensitive information if the next user is an
unauthorized user such as an industrial spy. Sanitization
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can be accomplished by overwriting the area on the
diskette with repeated sequences of ones and zeros. In
some systems, a diskette reformatting routine can be used
to overwrite previously recorded data. In addition, if a
diskette which contains sensitive information becomes
damaged or worn-out, then it should be destroyed before
disposal.
2.4 Telecommunication Security
Since users increasingly access corporate database
from remote sites, careful attention must be given to
telecommunication security. Communication lines are
vulnerable to eavesdropping, or to the insertion of an
unauthorized message. " A passive intruder listens to the
communication and an active intruder can alter or insert a
message [16]." Both types of intrusion can be accomplished
through wiretapping, i.e., by physically connecting to a
communication path. This brings up the physical security
issue of communication lines. The following two
requirements might be helpful to the physical security of
communication lines [ 20 ]
:
(1) Communication cables should be in a conduit or trench
whenever the cables are outside of the directly
controlled area.
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(2) Devices that provide central file storage and units
that control communication functions should be secured
in restricted areas, where only specially authorized
employees can enter.
In addition, user identification/authentication and
encryption may be the two most important measures to
successfully secure a communications line.
User identification/authentication can be
accomplished by requesting a series of passwords or keys
from the user making the request to access the system.
Once the user gains access to the system, the system
should place restrictions on what this user may do.
Limitation of what the user can do, once identified and
authenticated, is important to control potential damage
from unknown parties. To make this measure effective,
the selection of passwords (or keys) should be random,
should be changed frequently, and should also be long
enough to resist an exhaustive trial-and-error attack.
This means that systems should allow only few attempts by
a user trying to loggon before notifying authorities
and/or locking the device.
Encryption is probably the most promising control for
safeguarding the data on removable storage and
communications lines. It is highly recommended that, for
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security concerns, data should be encrypted before going
out over the communication lines. At this point,
encryption can be done in conjunction with other measures,
such as compression, packet formation, or check sum
calculation. This is called data link encryption [22].
There are three approaches to incorporating
encryption into a communications system [12]:
(1) Link-by- link.
( 2
)
Node-by-node
.
(3) End-to-end.
In link-by- link encryption, data is encrypted across
the medium connecting two directly communicating nodes.
Link-by- link encryption is logically independent of the
system and does not necessarily imply that the function of
encryption is integrated into the communicating nodes. It
can be thought of as implemented by a pair of encryption
devices bracketing the line between two communicating
nodes and their modems.
Node-by-node encryption is logically similar to link-
by-link encryption in that each link is protected by a
unique key. However the translation from one key to
another occurs within a security module, which may be a
peripheral device attached to the node. Moreover, plain
text occurs only within the security module, not within
the node.
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In end-to-end encryption, data encrypted at the
originating node is not decrypted until it arrives at its
final destination. The function of encryption is
integrated into the participating nodes to the extent that
the system can control the setting of the keys and turning
the encryption function on and off. The encryption
function to be provided by a host processor node could be
provided either by a prograituned implementation of the DES
algorithm or by special hardware integrated into the
central processing unit, into a front-end processor, or
into the channel.
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Chapter 3. Encryption Techniques
Hopefully, the previous discussion has demonstrated
that the encryption technique can be effective and
powerful for data both in storage and in transit. By
applying the encryption algorithm, one could transform
data into an unintelligent form which is useless to
unauthorized users. Only authorized users would be able
to reconstruct the secretly coded data back into its
original, clear form.
The federal encryption standard (Data Encryption
Standard) and a survey of some commercial software
packages which have an encryption facility will be
presented next.
3 . 1 The DES Algorithm
DES (Data Encryption Standard) is the Federal
standard for the encryption algorithm which was issued by
the U.S. National Bureau of Standards in 1977. It is a
symmetric encryption scheme — the same key is used for
both encryption and decryption. It uses a 64-bit key (of
which eight bits are for parity checking) to encrypt 64-
bit blocks of plaintext.
The algorithm begins and finishes with a permutation
of the 64 bits. In between, there is a series of 16
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iterations of complex transformations. A typical
iteration is illustrated in Figure 1 [19]. It uses 48
bits of the key in a sequence which is specified in the
standard, this is Kn. The right most 32 bits (Rn) of the
current version of the transformed input block are
expanded to 48 bits by the linear operator (E). These
bits are then added modulo 2 to Kn. The resulting 48 bits
are divided up into eight six-bit blocks, each of which is
transformed by one of the eight s-boxes into a four-bit
block. The resulting 32 bits undergo a permutation (P)
and are then added modulo 2 to the left most 32 bits (Ln)
of the current version of the transformed input block.
The two halves are now interchanged to yield the new,
current version of the transformed input block.
The original length of key which is selected by the
user is 56 bits. To bring the key up to block size, it is
artificially expanded to obtain a 64-bit key which is 8
bytes long. As there are over
70, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000 (seventy quadrillion) possible keys
of 56 bits and the key can be changed frequently, the
threat of someone finding the key can be almost
eliminated.
18
Ln
Rn
>i E ! •>! + i
I
I
Kn
•>'
I
^
I
I
-— Rn+1
-->j +
I
>
S - Boxes
Ln+1
Fig. 1 One of Sixteen Rounds of the DES
The DES algorithm can be applied in two different
modes [11]
:
1. Electronic Code Book Mode. Data is encrypted using a
key in a block of 64 bits. Each block of plain
text and encrypted text is independent of preceeding
and succeeding blocks.
2. Cipher Feedback Mode. The algorithm is used as a
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binary stream generator to produce random bits that
are combined with binary plain text using the
exclusive or logical operator to form binary encrypted
text. Input to the algorithm is the previous 64 bits
of data that were transmitted or received and as in
the alternate mode, a key must be used. Greater
security is obtained when this mode is used.
The following quotation outlines the position of the
National Bureau of Standards with regard to the
implementation of the data encryption standard [ 1 ]
:
The algorithm specified in this standard is to be
implemented in computer or related data communication
devices using hardware (not software) technology. The
specific implementation may depend on several factors such
as the application, the environment, the technology used,
etc. Implementations which comply with this standard
include Large Scale Integration (LSI) "chips" in an
individual electronic package, devices built from Medium
Scale Integration (MSI) electronic components, or other
electronic devices dedicated to performing the operations
of the algorithm. Micro-processors using Read Only
Memory (ROM) or micro-programmed devices using microcode
for hardware level control instructions are examples of
the latter.
From the above, one can see that DES was designed
for efficient hardware implementation. Although it has
been implemented in software, such implementations do not
comply with the standard and are generally inferior in
performance to hardware implementation. However, when an
organization's need does not justify the hardware
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approach, it is possible for that organization to use the
DES algorithm to develop its own software product. As
mentioned most software encryption is considerably slower
than hardware, but software is less costly than hardware
considering the initial investment.
3.2 Survey Of Commercial Software Packages
3.2.1 P/C Privacy (The trademark of MCtel)
This package consists of a disk which contains three
comparatively short programs. It can be used with floppy
and/or hard disk systems as well as for communications.
The software is available for microcomputers operating
under PC-DOS, MS-DOS, CP/M-80 and APPLE-DOS.
The system uses a proprietary algorithm. The
alphanumeric key or pass phrase may be as long as 100
characters. The system does not store the key, so it is
necessary to remember the key used for encryption. With
this algorithm it is possible to repeatedly encrypt a
previously encrypted file, and it is necessary to reverse
the order of the process to restore the plain text.
Encrypted files can be stored locally or they can be
sent through any electronic mail service, because all the
encryption characters are printable ASCII; and because a
carriage return/ line feed has been inserted after every
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65th character. Thus, files that could not previously be
sent via electronic mail because they contained control
characters, now are transmittable with P/C Privacy.
Another feature of P/C Privacy is that it allows
users to do a screen comparison of the "checksum" for an
original and decrypted file. A checksum is the sum of all
the byte values in a file and thus it is like a
fingerprint. If the checksums of an original and
decrypted file do not match, then the user knows
immediately that something has gone wrong in the
transmission of a file, or the wrong key has been used to
decrypt it.
In addition, this package has a purge feature that
destroys all evidence of the original file before
deletion. This is useful since files that are erased by
removing them from a DOS directory may remain on disk and
can be retrieved by using the Norton Utlities ( a set of
utilities which include programs to repair a damaged
diskette, to recover erased files, to control hidden
files, etc.). The purge feature actually over-writes the
original file to zero and thereby eliminates any record of
it on the disk.
3.2.2 DES-PAC (The trademark of Hawkeye Grafix Inc.)
This package is available for microcomputers
operating under PC-DOS, MS-DOS and CP/M-80. It can
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be used with any communications software which supports
file transfer. Three basic operations can be performed by
using functions available in DES-PAC such as , file
encryption/decryption, compression/decompression, and
SIXPAC formatting/deforraatting. These utilities are
written in "C".
Encryption/decryption uses the DES algorithm. Three
modes are provided which are Electronic code book. Cipher
feedback and Cipher block chain. Each technique for
encryption requires the user to input a 6 4 -bit key or an
eight character text string.
Compression/decompression allows a file to be reduced
in size, the amount of which is dependent upon context.
This reduction can range approximately from 10 to 50
percent, which greatly diminishes the transmission time
and disk storage requirements.
SIXPAC formatting/deformatting allows any file to be
converted to/from a format similiar to a text file. The
SIXPAC formatted file can be transmitted to any computer
such as an information service box. A batch file is
provided for ease of use in multiprocess operations such
as compress, encryption, and SIXPAC.
3.2.3 DataSafe (The trademark of Trigram Systems)
This system is available for most of the CP/M, PC-
23
DOS, MS-DOS systems. It uses the NBS DES algorithm. Two
modes are provided which are Electronic Code Book and
Ciper Block Chain (CBC). Either mode can be set as the
program default; CBC mode also allows the user to change
the default initializing vector.
Two key schemes can be used. One can be an eight
character hexadecimal key and the other can be an ASCII
character string of at least eight characters. In either
case, dual entry of the key is required for verification.
The verification function determines whether the plain
text has been encrypted and stored properly. It is not
necessary to use it every time, but it can be helpful if
the plain text is costly or impossible to recover.
The hexadecimal key function permits the user to
generate a key randomly; this key method is more secure
than an ASCII key. To use the key, however, the user must
write it down, which can compromise the encoding unless
caution is exercised to avoid destroying the written key,
or permitting discovery of the key by another individual
not authorized to know the key.
Two other useful functions are Checksum and
Authentication. They provide the capability to detect
whether a file has been changed either accidentally or by
deliberate tampering.
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3.2.4 PhasorCode 1000 (The trademark of Int'l Phasor Telecom)
This system , a menu-driven approach, is designed
principally for microcomputers. It is available for PC-
DOS/MS-DOS version 2. It secures confidential files in
local computer storage and in file servers in local area
networks
.
It uses the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) public-key
encryption system. A public-key system uses different
keys for encryption and decryption. That is, a public key
to encrypt and a private key to decrypt. The system has
automatic key management that provides for orderly control
and use of both public and private keys. There is no
limit to the number of encoding/decoding key pairs that
can be created nor the number of public encoding keys the
user may receive from potential recipients of secure
messages.
Greater security protection is provided by using a
pass phrase rather than a limited, single password. Any
pass phrase from 8 to 32 characters may be used. In
addition, it has following security enhancements:
(1) Increased protection of encoded files and key
directories. These files can not accidentally
deleted by the DOS delete command.
(2) Increased protection of decoding keys. To erase a
decoding key, the user must first enter a secret
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pass phrase to verify that he/she is authorized to
erase it.
3.2.5 SECURE! (The trademark of Winterhalter Inc.)
The system uses the DES algorithm. It works with
hard disk and floppy systems. It is available for MS-
DOS/PC-DOS 2.x and 3.X compatible. The system is a
combination of hardware (a PC bus board) and software.
It is an easy-to-use package. To encrypt a file or a
directory, all the user has to do is to complete three
simple steps. First, log in. Second, enter a password.
Finally, choose the information to be protected. The
system can show all directories and files in a graphic
display form, easing file selection. To use encrypted
files, the user simply logs in and runs his PC in the
normal way. The system automatically decrypts the files
when these files are used by the currently running
program.
This system offers two levels of data protection to
meet the user's security needs. It incorporates a master
key feature designed for organizations requiring
centralized administration. The security administration
can gain access to all encrypted files and directories.
Organizational information is given extra protection from
employee loss, missing passwords, and other compromises in
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security. For organizations not requiring centralized
security administration, SECURE! allows individual users
to iiranediately start using the system without the master
key which lowers the organizations' administrative and
installation expenses.
3.2.6 AutoCrypt I (The trademark of Jones Futurex Inc.)
This system provides transparent data security for
the PC and XT computer systems. The system manager
configures AutoCrypt I options according to the manager's
requirements. The program then controls access to the
system's files and programs by the user. This user
transparent method of disk security encrypts all data as
it is sent to the disk and decrypts it as it is read from
the disk. Additionally, access control is provided
through a user authentication code. This system is used
with the Jones Futurex Encryptor 30X series of DES
processors. Therefore, data going into the disk are
encrypted under the DES algorithm.
With this system, a manager who has access to all
machines assigns each user a key phrase up to 24
characters long. In conjunction with a master key which
exists only in the data encryption processor. Only the
manager's key phrase or a specific user's key phrase,
identified by the encryptor board in the PC, can open up
the data on a specific disk. Only the manager can make
27
plain text copies of the data, or allow another user to
access it.
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Chapter 4. Other Related Security Concerns
4.1 Risk Management
The most effective measure for protecting
computerized data processing systems which handle
sensitive information is through implementation of
effective risk management procedures. Because each
computer site and operating environment are unique, there
are no standard solutions or checklists which can be
applied to each site. Experience has shown that checklists
tend to stifle development of effective and imaginative
solutions to complex security problems.
The risk management methodology offers a disciplined
approach through which undesirable events can be
identified, measured, and controlled so as to minimize
loss. Its application can, at the same time, assist in
optimizing the amount of return from the security
invested dollar. The cost potentials of broadly applied,
marginally effective security features, are enormous and
underlie the need for effective risk management at each
site.
Two steps are needed for implementing an effective
risk management procedure. The first step is to perform
risk analysis and the second one is to perform risk
assessment. Risk analysis has two main aspects [21]: 1)
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identification of the undesirable events that can result,
and 2) threat analysis. These undesirable events are
usually categorized as follows: unauthorized disclosure,
modification and destruction of data, and denial of
service. Threat analysis also identifies the weak points
in security that may permit each threat. Consider, for
example, the threat that an unauthorized user may access
the system from a remote site by means of a password found
on a printout in the trash. Security weak points in this
example are (1) inadequate physical security of the remote
site; (2) failure to suppress printing of passwords; and
(3) inadequate physical security of sensitive trash.
Once the risks have been analyzed, a risk assessment
is carried out [21]. The undesirable events are rated and
ranked according to severity. These ratings are not
mathematically precise; rather they put risks into a
priority order. The likelihood of each event is then
related to its acceptability. A program for security is
then developed, with the cost of each measure being
considered in relation to the losses it is intended to
prevent. All this information can then be used as the
basis for a management decision about a security program.
After such a program has been implemented, it must be
monitored and evaluated periodically for effectiveness.
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4.2 Personnel Security
Most computer - related crimes that have been
uncovered were committed by company employees [15]. It
would therefore seem logical that control should be
exerted primarily over the employees using the system.
Employee turnover or unhappiness is a major concern
factor, and tends to occur when employees have low morale,
or are emotionally upset, or are badly overworked. To
minimize this likelihood, several practices can be
adopted [21,23]:
(1) High levels of performance and managerial abilities
should be recognized.
(2) Background checks on all prospective employees should
be part of the standard operating procedures.
(3) Ensuring that vacations are taken.
(4) Employee cross-training will reduce the impact of
turnover
.
(5) Providing grievance channels to allow employees to
discuss sources of dissatisfaction without
jeopardizing their positions.
(6) Proper supervision should be provided for all
employees. This will detect dangerous signals such
as alcohol, gambling, etc., as early as possible.
(7) Passwords should be disabled as soon as possible
when computer-use authorization ends (that is, when a
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user is fired, transferred, or resigned, or when a
compromise is suspected)
.
Hemphill[7] suggests a self -assessment checklist for
the management to determine if appropriate practices have
been adopted to ensure personnel security. This checklist
includes the following questions:
Y N Does management realize there must be a basic
reliance on the integrity of EDP employees and
that this obviates the need for careful employee
selection?
y N Is there a training program to make sure each
employee understands his vital role in
installation protection?
Y N Does management insist on continuing with a
problem employee?
Y N Is management alert to changes in employees?
Is help extended to those who appear to be
unstable?
Y N Are employees required to leave the premises
immediately if they are terminated?
Y N Does management judge applicant stability by
checking past residences, employments, and
references?
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Y N Does management judge applicant stability by an
examination of financial responsibility? By
maritial responsibility? By avoidance of arrest
problems? By driving record?
Y N When computer employees are hired in an emergency,
are they on probation until all personnel inquires
are completed and evaluated?
If the management answers N to any of the above
questions, this may indicated that the personnel security
should be strengthened.
4.3 Contingency Planning
Computer centers often follow routines from day to
day, intent on processing and current schedules, ignoring
the problems that could arise during an emergency. But it
is unrealistic to assume that the routine may continue
indefinitely. Management must expect to be forced at some
point to cope with the unexpected or the unknown.
Practical planning, then, should take this into account.
One responsibility of computer security is to ensure
that plans are made to backup critical hardware,
software, and data; required emergency responses have been
documented and roles assigned; and planning for recovery
from disasters can achieve complete system operation in a
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minimum time. Thus, in-place contingency plans are
necessary to minimize the damage caused by unexpected and
undesirable occurrences which might affect the system.
Donovan [3] mentions three general principles which
underlies contingency planning: 1) The probability of
occurrence of a disaster should be minimized
preventative measure; 2) The impact of a disaster, if it
should occur, should be minimized; 3) The probability of
recovering from a disaster should be maximized.
Applying these three general principles, it is
possible to develop a well designed contingency plan.
Such a plan would likewise consider the following three
elements [10]
:
(1) Backup operations: Procedures to ensure that essential
data processing tasks can be conducted after
disruption of the primary facility.
(2) Emergency response: Procedures to cover the
appropriate response in such an event as fire, flood,
water damage, bomb threat, or other natural disasters,
to protect lives, limit damage, and minimize the
impact upon the data processing operations.
(3) Recovery actions: Procedures to facilitate the rapid
restoration of data processing facilities following
physical failure or destruction, or loss of data.
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Chapter 5. Suiranary And Conclusions
This paper has presented four potential security
problems that exist in the new data processing environment
where microcomputers are used at end points. Several
measures for solving the security problems in this new
operating environment are described. These include:
1) Education programs for the first time end-user; 2)
Measures for ensuring physical security of microcomputers;
3) Measures for ensuring logical security of
microcomputers; 4) Measures for securing the
telecommunication lines; 5) Application of the encryption
technique for protecting data both in storage and in
transit. Last, three related security concerns for making
the data processing environment including the
microcomputers more secure were discussed. They are risk
management, personnel security, and contingency planning.
End-user computing not only distributes processing,
it also distributes the responsibility for security and
control, and likewise distributes fraud and disaster if
the organization is not careful. Even though there is no
complete solution for all security problems, many measures
will be present to ameliorate the severity of these
security problems. Because of the microcomputer link, the
corporate database has been exposed to a more hostile
environment, since the central site has no control over
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the data once it is sent out from the corporate database.
As a consequence of this fact, the security of the
mainframe may be weakened. To strengthen this
environment, organizations should not only consider the
security problems discussed earlier, but also must perform
their own security assessment to determine the appropriate
level of security that they actually need. In addition,
strong support should come from senior management. If
senior management believes that security is an important
issue, then the security concern will not be relegated to
a low priority. Finally, organizations should have their
exisiting security system assessed periodically to see if
their existing security program is appropriate to their
current operational environment. Thus, as one can see,
the future of end-user computing would be very bright if
these security problems can be properly solved and
controlled.
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Appendix A. Trademarks
The following trademarks have been used in this paper:
TRADE MARK COMPANY
AutoCrypt I
CP/M
CP/M-86
DataSafe
DES-PAC
MS/DOS
P/C Privacy
PhasorCode 1000
SECURE!
SIX-PAC
Jones Futurex Inc.
Digital Research
Digital Research
Trigram Systems
Hawkeye Grafix Inc.
Microsoft Corporation
MCTel
International Phaser Telecom Ltd.
Winterhalter Inc.
Hawkeye Grafix Inc.
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Appendix B. Selected Sources Of Software
The following is a list of addresses for companies whose
products are included in this paper. For product
tradenames see APPENDIX A.
Hawkeye Grafix Inc.
3415 Hyde Park
Clearwater, FL 33519
International Phaser Telecom Ltd.
Suite 200, 1508 West 2nd Ave.
Vancouver, B. C.
V6J 1H2
Jones Futurex Inc.
3079 Kilgore Road
Rancho Cordova, CA 95670
MCTel
Three Bala Plaza East, Suite 505
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
Trigram Systems
3 Bayard Road #66
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
Winterhalter Inc.
3853 Research Park Drive
P.O. Box 2180
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
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ABSTRACT
The micro-mainframe link has greatly enhanced the
concept of distributed computing. It improves the
productivity of end-users on their day-to-day work and
provides a wide variety of permutation and combination of
activity. But at the same time, it increases potential
security problems in the new data processing environment.
The majority of the newly introduced security
problems are at the micro sites, since current operating
systems for micros do not support the high-level security
that is possible on mainframe computers.
In this paper, several measures for solving the
security problems in the new environment are examined. In
addition, other related security concerns which might
strengthen the new environment are discussed.
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